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LAPTOP SEARCHES AT THE UNITED
STATES BORDERS AND THE BORDER
SEARCH EXCEPTION TO THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Abstract: The border search exception to the Fourth Amendment allows
broad discretion for United States customs officers to search the belong-
ings of incoming and outgoing international passengers and their lug-
gage. Although courts typically weigh the national security interest in the
search against the privacy invasion caused by a potentially intrusive
search,, most border searches are constitutional if they are either routine
or preceded by reasonable suspicion. Border searches of passengers' lap-
top computers, including hardware, software, and any external storage
devices, pose a constitutional issue. This Note argues that laptop searches
not preceded by reasonable suspicion are intrusive because the search
may invade upon personal, proprietary, or confidential information that a
passenger expects to be kept private, even at the border. Furthermore,
this Note argues that even those laptop searches that are preceded by rea-
sonable suspicion may not be constitutional, because border searches
must be limited in scope to that which may either confirm or disprove the
preceding suspicion.
INTRODUCTION
It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have fre-
quently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people.
—Justice William Brennani
In July 2005, Michael Arnold arrived at the Los Angeles Interna-
tional Airport after a nearly twenty-hour flight from the Philippines. 2
He collected his bags from the baggage carousel and proceeded to
the customs area, where he passed through a U.S. customs inspection
point.3
 He answered basic questions about his vacation, including
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 548 (1985) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (citing United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting)).
2
 United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999. 1001 (C.D. Cal. 2006); see also James
Gilden, Business Itinerary, L.A. Timm, Nov. 4, 2006, at 4.
3 Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1001.
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where he stayed and what activities he enjoyed during his trip. 4 The
customs official noticed that Arnold had a laptop computer and
memory stick.5 She handed these items to her colleague, who turned
the computer on and opened files in folders named "Kodak Memo-
ries" and "Kodak Pictures."6 Upon finding a picture of two nude
women, the second customs agent called Immigration and Customs
Enforcement ("ICE") officials, who questioned Arnold for several
hours.? They ran a more thorough search of Arnold's computer,
which uncovered numerous photographs of naked children. 8 ICE of-
ficials seized Arnold's computer, and received a warrant to search the
computer several weeks later. 9
In October 2006, in United States v. Arnold, the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California decided that a border laptop
search without reasonable suspicion, such as the one Mr. Arnold was
subjected to, was intrusive. ] ° The District Court's analysis of a laptop
search in Arnold differs greatly from that of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, which was faced with the same issue in a case
with very different circumstances." In 2005, in United. States v. Ickes,
the Fourth Circuit decided that a border laptop search preceded by
reasonable suspicion was not intrusive and did not violate an interna-
donal traveler's Fourth Amendment rights. 12 Further complicating
the issue, in July 2006 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
which may hear Arnold's appeal, already considered this issue, but
Id.
5 Id. A memory stick, sometimes called a "flash drive," "thumb drive," "jump drive," or
"key drive," is a small memory storage device that connects through a Universal Serial Bus
port connection or a firewire port on a computer. Michel Marriot, From Storage, a New Fash-
ion, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2005, at Gl. Although a floppy diskette is capable of storing no
more than 1.4 megabytes of data, a memory stick can store anywhere from 32 megabytes to
2 gigabytes, or 2048 megabytes. Id.
6 Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1001.
7 Id. ICE, the largest investigative branch of the Department of Homeland Security, is
responsible for conducting investigations at the border. U.S. Immigrations and Customs
Enforcement, About Us, Intp://www,ire.goviaboutioperations.htm (last visited Mar. 29,
2007).
Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1001.
9 Id.
10 Id. For a comprehensive analysis of the Fourth Amendment implications of com-
puter and digital media searches taking place in the interior of the United States, see gen-
erally Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HAKV. L. REv. 531 (2005).
11 See Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1001; see also United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 507-
08 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding a nonrandom laptop search reasonable because it occurred at
the border).
12 393 F.3d 507-508.
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only to an extent" In United States a Romm, that court ruled that a
border search of a passenger's laptop, also preceded by reasonable
suspicion, was permissible." Nevertheless, due to an omission in the
petitioner's initial pleading, the Romm court did not answer the ques-
tion typically posed to courts evaluating border searches: was the lap-
top inspection so intrusive as to exceed the scope of a routine
scare h? 15
With growing computer portability and accessibility of wireless net-
working, business and leisure travelers are increasingly taking along lap-
top computers or other portable media storage devices during interna-
tional trave1. 16
 After the September 11, 2001 attack on the United States
and foiled terrorist attempts on approximately ten United States-bound
passenger jets on August 10, 2006, the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security ("DHS") increased security measures in airports, expanding
investigations of international passengers and their belongings. 17 U.S.
Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") and ICE, both DHS bureaus,
are charged with patrolling the country's borders to prevent terrorist
activities and facilitate legitimate trave1. 18 CBP interviews passengers,
searches luggage, and enforces duties and tariffs. 19 Its responsibilities
range from identifying smugglers of illegal meat or narcotics to turning
away illegal aliens to preventing future terrorist actixities. 2°




 Press Release, Travel Industry Association, Staying Wired on Vacation: Travelers' Use
of Technology on the Road (July 25, 2006), http://wwtv.tia.org/pressmedh/pressrec .
asp?Item=719.
17 See John Ward Anderson & Karen DeYoung, Plot to Bomb U.S.-Bound Jets Is Foiled,
Pos•, Aug. 11, 2006, at AOL On the morning of August 10, 2006, twenty-four sus-
pects were arrested at London's Heathrow Airport in connection with a suspected plot to
blow up as many as ten U.S.-bound aircraft by detonating liquid explosives during flight.
See id; see also Alan Cowell, Court Permits British Investigators to Hold 10 Terror Suspects Longer,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 2006, at A6.
15 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CBP Border Patrol Overview, http://ww •.
cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/border
 patrol/overview.xml (last visited Mar. 29, 2007);
U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, supra note 7. Generally, the CBP's duties in-
clude inspection and interdiction, while ICE oversees investigations. U.S. Immigrations and
Enforcement, supra note 7. This Note refers to both ICE and CBP officials as "customs offi-
cials," as U.S. customs legislation does not differentiate between the legal border authorities
of officers from either agency, referring to them broadly as "customs officials." 19 U.S.C.
§ 1401 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
19 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, supra note 18.
25 Id. On an average day in fiscal year 2006, CBP processed 1.1 million passengers, in-
cluding the inspection of rail and sea containers, international air passengers, ship passen-
gers, and privately owned vehicles. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, On a Typical Day,
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During a border inspection, a customs officer might become sus-
picious about a passenger and conduct a search of that individual's
computer to confirm or disprove these suspicions.21 In other situations,
a customs officer might select a passenger at random, or with no rea-
sonable suspicion, for a computer search. 22 Searches of computers en-
tering the United States fall under CRP's broad plenary powers. 23 Al-
though many passengers travel with far less egregious materials on their
computers than Mr. Arnold, CBP and ICE search through personal and
proprietary data contained on a large number of travelers' computers
every year.24 CBP and ICE's abilities to search a computer's hard drive,
memory sticks, cached files, and digital media storage devices raise
questions about customs officials' authority which, left unchecked,
might violate passengers' rights at the U.S. borders. 25
This Note explores the constitutionality of border searches of lap-
top computers.26 Part I examines the border search exception to the
Fourth Amendment's stringent requirements for a warrant or probable
cause.27 It also describes how the U.S. Supreme Court, in a collection of
opinions largely authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, has defined the
threshold question for suspicionless border searches as whether the
search is routine or nonroutine. 28 Part II describes three lower court
decisions regarding the constitutionality of laptop computer searches at
h ttp:/ /www. cbp.gov/I in khandler/ cgov/ n ewsroom/fact_shee ts/ cbp_overview/ typical_day.
en/ typical_day.pdf (last visited July 24, 2007). On average, at points of entry, officials con-
fiscated 1769 pounds of narcotics; seized $157,800 in undeclared or illicit currency and
$646,900 worth of fraudulent commercial merchandise; and intercepted 71 fraudulent
documents, 20 smuggled aliens, and 1.5 travelers related to terrorism concerns. Id.
21 See Ickes, 393 F.3d at 507.
22 See Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1006.
28 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, supra note 18. CBP officials may search air, wa-
ter, and land craft that are entering or exiting the United States. Id. Between official ports
of entry, CBP employs a comprehensive technological approach, including unmanned
aerial vehicles, remote video surveillance, and computer-based Geographic Information
Systems (GIS), to survey and map potential border crossings. Id.
24 Gilden, supra note 2. A survey of business travelers conducted by the Association of
Corporate Travel Executives found that 90% of its 2500 members were not aware that cus-
toms officials might conduct a search of their laptops at the U.S. borders. Joe Sharkey, To
Do List: Rename Files Grandma's Favorite Recipes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2006, at C6.
" See Arnold, 454 F. Stipp. 2d at 1007.
26 See infra notes 33-292 and accompanying text. For this Note, the term laptop" shall
apply to a portable personal computer and any accompanying digital storage device. See
Kerr, supra note 10, at 538. Nevertheless, an analysis of border searches of other digital
devices, such as mobile telephones, personal data assistants, and handheld entertainment
devices such as MP3 players or gaming devices might include similar arguments. See id.
27 See infra notes 33-67 and accompanying text.
sa See infra notes 68-133 and accompanying text.
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the border." Part III applies the Supreme Court's border search ana-
lytical framework to laptop computer searches, and argues that a laptop
search is nonroutine because it is deeply intrusive." This Note con-
chides that computer searches should be preceded by reasonable suspi--
cion to be constitutional.31
 Part IV proposes an additional requirement
that all laptop searches at the border be limited in scope to that which
is necessary to confirm the custom officer's reasonable suspicion about
the passenger or his computer."
I. LAPTOP SEARCHES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE BORDER SEARCH
EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution governs searches
and seizures conducted by government officials." The Amendment
requires that prior to conducting a search, government officials obtain
a warrant that specifically describes the place, person, or items to be
searched or seized." Except under specific circumstances discussed
" See infra notes 134-194 and accompanying text.
" See infra note 195-253 and accompanying text. Although commentators have com-
pared searches of laptop computers at the U.S borders to routine searches of automobiles or
briefcases, they have neglected to consider that a laptop search is deeply invasive, thui mak-
ing it nonroutine and necessitating reasonable suspicion by a customs officer. See Kelly A.
Gilmore, Preserving the Border Search Doctrine in a Digital World: Reproducing Electronic Evidence at
the Border, 72 BROOK. L. Rev. 759, 797 (2007). A passenger's laptop or digital storage device is
not analogous to permissibly searched hard copies of documents or tangible folders. See infra
note 229 and accompanying text. hi fact, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
1986 found in United States v. Fortna that it was permissible for a customs official to make a
photocopy of documents found in an international traveler's luggage, in part because the
searching officer had reasonable suspicion to believe the passenger was participating in an
international drug smuggling ring. 796 F.2d 724, 738 (5th Cir. 1986). Nevertheless, Fortna's
permissible photocopying is not analogous to a random laptop or digital search at the bor-
der, because the search in Fortna was preceded by reasonable suspicion. See id. Furthermore,
even if a laptOp search is preceded by suspicion, as in Fortna, this holding is still not analo-
gous, because, unlike a briefcase with tangible documents, computers may store an incompa-
rable amount of data, the entirety of which is outside the scope of any border search,
whether prompted by an officer's suspicion or not. See id.
31
 See infra note 195-253 and accompanying text.
" Sec infra notes 254-292 and accompanying text.
" U.S. CoNs-r. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides, It] he right of the peo-
ple to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Id.
4 Id. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to invalidate most
warrantless and unreasonable searches. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)
(noting that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by
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below, courts strictly enforce this requirement, in part to protect indi-
viduals from searches that unreasonably intrude upon their privacy."
The warrant clause also serves as a deterrent against overzealous police
officers who might otherwise act on a mere hunch.36
Nevertheless, several exceptions to the warrant clause permit po-
lice officers and government officials to conduct warrantless searches. 37
These exceptions typically involve exigent circumstances in which ob-
taining judicial approval and a warrant is impractical and counterpro-
ductive." The U.S. Supreme Court has reasoned that when exigent cir-
cumstances arise, the Constitution permits government authorities to
conduct searches and seizures quickly before receiving judicial ap-
proval." One example of an exigent circumstance is the border search
exception, which permits U.S. - customs officials to conduct routine
searches of travelers entering and exiting the country when it would be
infeasible to obtain a warrant. 40
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only
to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions").
15 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). The Supreme Court has long
recognized that the warrant clause interposes a neutral judicial body between the govern-
ment official and the individual, in part to prevent an officer from acting in his own dis-
cretion on information that might be vague or incorrect. Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963); see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S, 543, 554 (1976)
("The Fourth Amendment imposes limits on search-and-seizure powers in order to prevent
arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and per-
sonal security of individuals.").
36 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). The deterrent effect of the warrant clause
might provide police officers and government officials with an incentive to follow the
proper search and seizure procedure or risk inadmissibility of any evidence collected.
11/4+1app v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
37 Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. Those circumstances in which government officials may search
a person or her possessions without a warrant include investigatory detentions, searches
incident to a valid arrest, seizures of items in plain view, consent searches, searches of vehi-
cles, searches of containers, inventory searches, border searches, searches at sea, adminis-
trative searches, and searches in which law enforcement officials have a special need that
renders obtaining probable cause and a warrant impracticable. 34 Gco. L.J. ANN. REV.
CRIM. PRO. 37 (2005). See generally Christopher R. Dillion, Note, Wren v. United States and
Pretextual Traffic Stops: The Supreme Court Declines to Plumb Collective Conscience of Police, 38
B.C. L. REV. 737 (1997) (analyzing the Supreme Court's exploration of the proper bal-
ance between individual rights and efficient law enforcement").
3a United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985) (holding that the
`Fourth Amendment's balance of reasonableness is qualitatively different at the interna-
tional border than in the interior").
56 Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that in cases in-
volving a permissible warrantless arrest, a magistrate must determine that there was prob-
able cause to extend the detention. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538. A routine search is a nonintrusive search
that may be conducted without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion. See
2007]	 Laptop Border Searches & the Fourth Amendment
	 977
This Part examines the border search exception to the Fourth
Amendment, and describes the context and judicial framework with
which a warrantless border search is analyzed. 41
 It also explains how rea-
sonable suspicion is not required for a routine search, but is necessary
fo- r a nonroutine search. 42
 Finally, this Part evaluates the dual role that a
search's scope plays in the analysis of a constitutional border search. 43
A. Expanding the Boundaries of the Fourth Amendment: Justification and
Evaluation of Warrantless Searches
When circumstances do not permit a government official to obtain
judicial approval of a search or seizure, the official may legally search
an individual or his property, so Iong as the action is based on more
than an "inarticulate hunch.”44
 The correct level of suspicion to justify a
warrantless search depends on the circumstance of the search. 45 In al-
most all cases, officials must have some degree of suspicion prior to a
warrantless search indicating that an individual is about to, has already,
or is in the process of committing a crime. 46
 Government officials may,
however, conduct routine searches at the U.S. border with no suspicion
at al1. 47
 Nonroutine border searches, on the other hand, do require
that the official have reasonable suspicion that the traveler is violating
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973) (holding that because vehicle
search at the border was unintrusive and therefore routine, reasonable suspicion was not
required prior to search). A nonroutine search is an intrusive search that must be pre-
ceded by reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Adekunle, 2 F.3d 559, 561 (5th Cir.
1993) (holding that a border search that included an x-ray was nonroutine).
41
 See infra notes 99-51 and accompanying text
47 See infra notes 52-92 and accompanying text
43
 See infra notes 93-133 and accompanying text.
44 Terry. 392 U.S. at 22. In its analysis of a warrantless police search of three individuals,
the Court noted that 'failure to comply with the warrant requirement can only be excused
by exigent circumstances." Id. at 20.
" Id. The Supreme Court's early warrantless search jurisprudence analogized war-
rantless searches to the country's customs laws, where Congress stated that government
officials may stop, board, and search vessels to check for contraband, such as stolen goods,
or products liable to duties. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977). The Court
historically required that officers have probable cause prior to searching an automobile,
for example, for contraband alcohol. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 199 (1925).
Later,, the Court rejected the more stringent probable cause standard, holding instead that
the threshold requirement for a constitutional warrantless search is that the search must
be reasonable. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
46
 Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
47
 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538.
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or is planning to violate a law." As the intrusiveness of a search hi
creases, so too does the level of required suspicion."
To evaluate a warrantless search, the U.S. Supreme Court and
lower federal courts typically weigh the government's interest in the
warrantless search or seizure against the invasiveness of the search. 5°
This evaluation is sometimes characterized as a two-part inquiry: courts
will first identify the initial reason or suspicion for the search, then con-
skier whether the scope of the search is reasonably related to that sus-
picion.51
B. The Border Search Exception: Warrants Are Not Required for Routine
Searches at the United States Borders
The border search exception to the Fourth Amendment permits
government officials at the country's borders to conduct routine
searches of individuals and their personal effects without judicial ap-
proval or a warrant. 52 The border search exception is widely employed
4° See United States v. Flores-Montano, 591 U.S. 149, 152 (2004).
4° Id.
5° Sec Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21 (finding that a warrantless police pat down of three indi-
viduals was reasonable, after balancing the intrusion upon the individuals' dignity against
the government's interest in protecting the community, which may be served by pat downs
and brief on-the-street searches). The Court has reasoned that "there can be no ready test
for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the
invasion which the search entails.' Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 536-37
(1967). Nevertheless, Justice William Douglas harshly criticized the weight afforded to the
government in this balancing test, arguing that the Framers of the Constitution intended a
more stringent standard of suspicion to prevent police officers from encroaching on an
individual's constitutional right of privacy. Terry, 392 U.S. at 35-37 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
51 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 391 (1985). In separating reasonableness from
probable cause, the Court has severed the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness clause
from the warrant clause, and the Terry ruling has come to be interpreted, generally, as
meaning that either reasonableness or a warrant is necessary for a search. See Scott E.
Sun by, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72
MINN. L. REV. 383, 403-04 (1988) ("If the Court uses the warrant clause, the reasonable-
ness balancing test controls the inquiry in the guise of flexible probable cause: traditional
probable cause serves as only one example of probable cause. If the Court utilizes the rea-
sonableness clause, the same balancing test controls, again precluding any independent
rale for traditional probable cause.").
52 See 6 U.S.C. § 251 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (granting authority to the Under Secre-
tary for Border and Transportation Security of the Department of Homeland Security to
conduct a warrantless search of a person who is seeking entry into the United States);
Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 272 (holding that the power of the federal government "can
be effectuated by routine inspections and searches of individuals or conveyances seeking
to cross our borders").
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throughout the country's airports," where customs officials may search
travelers entering and exiting the United States. 54
 At the country's bor-
ders, the government has the authority to inspect packages to regulate
the collection of duties, prevent the introduction of contraband into
the United States, and protect against dangerous products." Included
among customs officials' plenary authority is the ability to conduct rou-
tine and nonroutine searches. 56
A routine search might include an inspection of the passenger's
• vehicle, luggage, wallet, handbag, and clothing. 57
 Upon entering the
United States as a visitor, an individual might be asked general or spe-
cific questions about his trip, including his destination, purpose for
visiting the States, place of stay, and how much cash he has on hand."
53 See United States v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 1287. 1290 (7th Cir. 1993). The border search
exception may be utilized at any of the country's borders, and includes international air-
ports, which may not be an official national border, but are the functional equivalent of a
border. Id. (finding that international travelers entering Chicago's O'Hare Airport were at
the functional equivalent of a border).
34
 See, e.g., Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 533 (passenger was entering the United
States from Bogota, Colombia); United States v. Berisha, 925 F.2d 791, 795 (5th Cir. 1991)
(border search exception applies to individuals exiting the United States).
63 See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 611-12. The Court quoted the first customs statute, which
"granted customs officials 'full power and authority' to enter and search 'any ship or ves-
sel, in which they shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to
duty shall be concealed . . . .'" Id. at 616 (quoting Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat.. 29 (re-
pealed 1790)).
36 See 19 U.S.C. § 1582 (2000) ("The Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe regula-
tions for the search of persons and baggage and all persons coming into the United
States from foreign countries shall be liable to detention and search by authorized officers
or agents of the Government under such regulations."). The Supreme Court has held that
customs officials may conduct routine searches with no requirement of reasonable suspi-
cion, probable cause, or warrant. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538; Ramsey, 431 U.S. at
619. Implicitly, the Court has held that nonroutine searches do implicate Fourth Amend-
ment protections, although here too the Court has loosened the standards for the amount
of suspicion required. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541. Based on its ruling in Montoya
de Hernandez, it is unlikely the Court would ever require a warrant and probable Cause to
proceed with a routine search. Id. Nevertheless, the Court has implied that some degree of
reasonable suspicion is required prior to a nonroutine search. See id. See generally Jon Ad-
ams, Rights at United States Borders, 19 BYU J. Puts. L. 353 (2005) (discussing the border
search exception and its efficacy).
37
 See Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 272 (holding that vehicle search at the border was
routine); United States v. Beras, 183 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that a pat down is
a routine search); Johnson, 991 F.2d at 1291 (holding that extensive inspection of a trav-
eler's suitcase was routine); United States v. Charleus, 871 F.2d 265, 267-68 (2d Cir. 1989)
(holding that requiring a passenger to lift up his shirt for a border official to touch him
lightly was routine).
38
 See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 533 (describing how after customs official no-
ticed that passenger had completed eight recent round-trip visits to the United States, she
was asked more detailed questions by a secondary customs officer).
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An American citizen or resident returning to the United States from a
visit or stay in another country might be asked similar questions about
her trip, including where she stayed and her purpose for traveling
in tern ationally. 59
There is no bright-line rule to determine what type of search is
nonroutine.6° Most courts have held, for example, that strip
searches," x-ray examinations, 62 and body cavity inspections° are
nonroutine, in part because they are physically intrusive searches that
implicate the dignity and privacy interests of the person being
searched." For situations where there is little agreement, lower courts
have developed tests to distinguish nonroutine searches. 65 Some
courts take the approach that a nonroutine search must invade a per-
son's physical boundaries; this involves a touch or bodily inspection
that could embarrass or offend the average traveler. 66 Other courts
reason that a nonroutine search is simply an invasive search, because
it intrudes upon an individual's dignity and privacy interests. 67
The U.S. Supreme Court has not explicitly distinguished routine
from nonroutine searches. 68 Nevertheless, the Court has, in dicta, sup-
59 See United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1001 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
69 See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152; Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540.
61 United States v. Amara, 624 F.2d 911, 912-13 (9th Cir. 1980) (reasoning that because
a strip search is nonroutine, it requires reasonable suspicion prior to the search).
65 See Adekunle, 2 F.3d at 561-62 (holding that a border search that included an x-ray
was nonroutine).
63 Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967).
" See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152.
66 Sec United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 511-12 (1st Cir, 1988). The First Circuit, for
example, has developed a six-part analysis to determine whether a search is nonroutine,
which includes an inquiry into whether the search abrogated the suspect's reasonable
expectations of privacy. Id.; see also United States v. Sandler, 644 F.2d 1163, 1167 (5th Cir.
1981) (suggesting that a nonroutine search might be dangerous, painful, embarrassing, or
invoke one's dignity).
66 Johnson, 991 F.2d at 1291 (holding that a weight test, flex test, and scratch test on a
traveler's suitcase was a routine search); see Charleus, 871 F.2d at 268 (holding that light
touching of a traveler's back and the requirement that he lift his shirt for a CBP officer was
routine, implicitly because it was not a highly intrusive search that implicated the suspect's
dignity); Brake, 842 F.2d at 513 (holding that physical contact between a customs official
and passenger was a factor in the test for intrusiveness).
67 Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1002. But see United States v. Moya, 74 F.3d 1117, 1120
(11th Cir. 1996) ("[Bjecause of the sovereign's responsibility, some degree of questioning
and of delay is necessary and is to be expected at entry points into the United States. Be-
cause of this expectation, questioning at the border must rise to a distinctly accusatory
level before it can be said that a reasonable person would feel restraints on his ability to
roam.").
69 See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540.
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ported the notion that strip searches, body cavity, or x-rays are likely to
be considered nonroutine searches. 69
As in general warrantless search cases, the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts employ a balancing test to determine whether a
border search violates an individual's Fourth Amendment rights. 70
Here, too, courts weigh the government's interest in the warrantless
search or seizure against the invasiveness of the search. 71 In border
search cases, the government has a strong interest in national self pro-
tection that reasonably requires an entrant—whose expectation of pri-
vacy, the Supreme Court has indicated, is quite low—to identify himself
and his belongings as authorized to enter the country." Nevertheless,
courts have indicated that at a certain point, the intrusion of a search
outweighs the national security interest, and the search is unconstitu-
tional."
I. Routine Searches Do Not Require Reasonable Suspicion
In the earliest border search cases, the U.S. Supreme Court ex-
amined the border search exception by applying its balancing test and
found that routine border checkpoints require neither a warrant nor
probable cause. 74
 In 1976, in United States v Martinez-Fuerte, the Court
held that a routine warrantless and suspicionless border search was
constitutional." In Martinez-Fuerte, a number of arrestees claimed that
border patrol agents violated their Fourth Amendment rights by
stopping their vehicles for brief questioning, even though the officials
did not have any reason to believe those individuals were perpetrating
or about to perpetrate a crime." justice Powell, writing for the major-
69 Id at 541.
7° See id. at 539-90.
71 Id.
72
 Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152; Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 551 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
73 See Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1007. Considering the potential amount of personal,'
professional, and proprietary information that an individual may store on a laptop com-
puter, the calculus of one's expectation of privacy is qualitatively different than for that of
a piece of luggage or wallet. Sec infra notes 251-254 and accompanying text.
74
 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561-62; sec Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21. Although the Su-
preme Court has declined to distinguish between routine and nonroutine searches, the
Court has been consistently clear that routine searches may be suspicionless or random.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538. ("Routine searches of the persons and effects of
entrants are not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or
warrant. ") .
73 See 428 U.S. at 595.
7° See id.
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ity, reasoned that these stops were constitutional because the govern-
ment's need to conduct routine border checkpoint stops was high
and the intrusion on the individuals' Fourth Amendment interests
was limited. 77 Thus, the Court eschewed its earlier "reasonable suspi-
cion" requirement from the 1968 case Terry v. Ohio, implicitly because
most checkpoint searches are routine. 78
Importantly, the Court held that the Martinez-Fuerte checkpoint
stops did not require any individualized suspicion, as long as the
checkpoints were reasonably located.79 In this way, the Court foreshad-
owed its later categorization of the balancing test as two fold. 8° Balanc-
ing the government's interest against the interests of the motorists, the
Court first held that the police action was justified then decided that
the routine border searches were reasonably related in scope to the cir-
cumstances. 81 The government interest was in stemming the rising rate
of illegal aliens entering the coun try. 82
2. Nonroutine Searches Require Reasonable Suspicion
. In situations where the border search may have been nonroutine,
courts ask whether the search was reasonable. 88 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that as the intrusiveness of the
search increases, the level of requisite reasonable suspicion increases
as wel1. 84 The constitutionality of the search depends on whether the
official conducting the search had reasonable suspicion, and whether
the scope of the search was reasonable. 85
When a customs official first encounters a passenger, the infor-
mation she gathers during the routine search or questioning might
give her suspicion that a nonroutine search would uncover illegal
products or contraband. 88 To determine whether a border official had
77 See id. at 557.
76 Id, at 561.
79 Id. at 561-62.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562; see TL.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562; see T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556.
83 See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537.
al United States v. Vance, 62 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 1995).
55
 See id.
86 See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1989) (explaining that officials had
reasonable suspicion to believe traveler was transporting drugs because he: paid cash for
his airplane fare; traveled under a pseudonym; was traveling from Miami, a source city for
illicit drugs; stayed in Miami for only 48 hours, even though a round-trip flight from his
destination was 20 hours; appeared nervous during the trip; did not check any luggage).
In Montoya de Hernandez, the Court refused to draw a clear line between reasonable suspi-
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the requisite level of suspicion prior to a nonroutine border search,
courts examine the totality of the circumstances.87 This might include
an officer's suspicions about the passenger's demeanor, belongings,
or itinerary. 88
 An officer generally has a particularized and objective
basis for reasonable suspicion when the traveler acts strangely or ap-
prehensively, does not check any luggage, has an unorthodox travel
plan, refuses to answer routine questions, or if the authorities discover
incriminating information during a routine search.89 Similar factors
apply to customs officials' reasonable suspicions about a passenger's
luggage." In many cases, a lack of checked luggage for a long trip or
the type of luggage a passenger brings might give an officer reason-
able suspicion. 91 The threshold for reasonable suspicion at the border
is so low, in fact, that the only circumstance that would likely not meet
this standard is a complete lack of suspicion, or a random search. 92
C. The Dual Role of a Search's Scope in the Border Search futisprudence
The scope of a border search occupies a dual role in border
search jurisprudence.93 Scope defines whether a search is routine or
nonroutine, but it also determines how far a customs officer can go in
conducting the search."
cion and probable cause, simply stating instead that the customs official had a reasonable
suspicion based on all the facts surrounding the traveler and her trip. 473 U.S. at 541 n.4.
The Court has noted, however, that the reasonable suspicion standard requires a particu-
larized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person of the illegal activity.
United States v. Cortez, 949 U.S. 411,417-18 (1981).
el Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417.
as See id. at 419 (Witten used by trained law enforcement officers, objective facts,
meaningless to the untrained, can be combined with permissible deductions from such
facts to form a legitimate basis for suspicion of a particular person and for action on that
suspicion."); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 922 U.S. 873,884-85 (1975) ("Officers may
consider the characteristics of the area in which they encounter a vehicle. Its proximity to
the border, the usual patterns of traffic on the particular road, and previous experience
with alien traffic are all relevant.").
89 See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 533 (describing haw international traveler was
nervous, did not know where she was going to stay, had packed inappropriate items for a
vacation in Miami, and had limited cash); United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501,502-03 (4th
Cir. 2005) (describing how traveler was acting suspicious, brought superfluous items with
him on his alleged vacation, and officers discovered an outstanding warrant during a rou-
tine search).
99 See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U .S. at 534.
91 See id.
92 See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152-53,
93 See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 542; Ramsey, 931 U.S. at 624-25.
91
 See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 542; Ramsey, 931 U.S. at 624-25.
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1. Scope Defines the Reasonableness of a Border Search
Although the U.S. Supreme Court's border search jurisprudence
does not delineate the exact line that separates routine from non-
routine searches, it is implicit in the Court's reasoning that a routine
search is more limited in scope than a nonroutine search 9 5 Because
the scope of a search factors into whether the search is intrusive, the
scope contributes to the distinction between a routine and a non-
routine search." To determine whether a search is so intrusive that it
has become unreasonable, the Court implicitly weighs the govern-
ment interest against the level of intrusion, and asks if the scope of
the search was appropriate as it related to the officer's suspicion. 97
The U.S. Supreme Court's 1985 decision in United Slates u Montoya
de Hernandez applied this test, balancing the government interest in the
search against the intrusiveness of the search.98 Applying its border
search exception analysis, the Court questioned whether holding and
searching a traveler at the Los Angeles International Airport was rea-
sonable in scope. 99 A customs official suspected Ms. Montoya de Her-
nandez, an airline passenger from Colombia, of smuggling drugs in her
digestive tract.'" She was subjected to a pat down, strip search, and a
sixteen hour wait in the customs office under observation before cus-
toms officials received a court order authorizing them to administer a
pregnancy test, x-ray, and a rectal examivaation. 101 Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the court, along with a concurrence from Justice Stevens,
balanced the intrusion upon Ms. Montoya de Hernandez's privacy
against the government's interest of protecting its citizens at the bor-
der. 102 Justice Rehnquist gave considerable deference to customs offi-
cials and the national security interests they sought to protect,'" Con-
cluding that the search was constitutional, Justice Rehnquist noted that
99 See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154-55.
98 See id.
97 See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537. Here as well, the Court gives great defer-
ence to the government's interest in protecting the integrity of the country's borders. Id.
at 538.
98 1d. at 539-40.
8° Id. at 542.
100 Id. at 534.
101 Id. at 534-35.
1 °2 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 539-40.
109 Id. at 540.
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at the border, the Fourth Amendment balance will weigh more favora-
bly in the government's direction.'"
Justice Brennan's strong dissent in Montoya de Hernandez expressed
concern that the government's interest was given too much weight
against an individual's rights to privacy. 1 °5
 Justice Brennan described
the search of Ms. Montoya de Hernandez as "disgusting and sadden-
ing."106 He accused the Court of attempting to convert the Fourth
Amendment into a general balancing test, a process "in which the judi-
cial thumb apparently will be planted firmly on the law . enforcement
side of the scales."07
2. All Border Searches Must Be Limited in Scope
The scope of the search must be limited in both routine and
nonroutine searches. 108
 The U.S. Supreme Court has implied that- all
routine and nonroutine searches, regardless of their precedent suspi-
cion, must be limited in some way in their scope. 109
 Courts have held
that for a nonroutine search, the scope must be limited to that which
is necessary to confirm or disprove the official's reasonable suspicions
that preceded the search.u°
I" Id. at 539, 540. This holding echoed the Ramsey Court's reasoning that many
searches made at the border, pursuant to the U.S. government's authority to protect the
country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border. Id; Ram-
sey, 431 U.S. at 616.
''35
 473 U.S. at 558 (Brennan, j., dissenting).
I" Id. at 545 (quoting United States v. Holtz, 479 F.2d 89, 94 (9th Cir. 1973) (Ely, J.,
dissenting) (regarding a similar case, which involved border police disrobing and search-
ing a female entrant into the United States)).
107 Id, at 558.
aoa See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 347.
1()9 See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618 n.13. Although the Ramsey Court refused to "decide
whether, and under what circumstances, a border search might be deemed 'unreasonable'
because of the particularly offensive manner in which it is carried out," the Court implied
that there is a point at which this might occur. See id. The Flores-Montano Court, noting that
variations in facts among border search cases make such a distinction difficult, also de-
clined to decide this issue. 541 U.S. at 154-55 11.2. Nevertheless, the Court implied that,
had the disassembly of the gasoline tank resulted in extreme destruction, loss of property,
or presented a danger to the motorist, then the search may have been excessive in scope.
See id.
tio See United States v. Palmer 575 F.2d 721, 723 (9th Cir. 1978) ("In our judgment, in
such a case if suspicion is founded on facts specifically relating to the person to be
searched, and if the search is no more intrusive than necessary to obtain the truth respect-
ing the suspicious circumstances, then the search is reasonable."); see also United States v.
Price, 472 F.2d 573, 574-75 (9th Cir. 1973) (reasoning that a border strip search of an
individual was reasonable, but officers were not permitted to continue the search when it
did not reveal the item for which they were looking). The Ninth Circuit, for example, has
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In addition to the balancing test, the U.S. Supreme Court has
looked at the scope of the search as it relates to the suspicion sur-
rounding the individual or her belongings."' For example, in 1972,
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in United States v. Ramsey, up-
held the scope of a search of international mail. 112 Without defin-
ing the search as routine or nonroutine, the Court nonetheless held
that the scope of the search was appropriate, in part because the offi-
cer had reasonable cause to suspect the envelopes contained contra-
band after observing that the envelopes were bulky, weighing the en-
velopes, and then feeling the envelopes from the outside. 13 Justice
Rehnquist further held that opening the envelope was not an uncon-
stitutional search, but noted that had the envelopes contained corre-
spondence, the officer would have been required to obtain a warrant
prior to reading the envelopes' contents.'" Justice Rehnquist implic-
itly acknowledged that reading the correspondence would be beyond
the scope of a reasonable search." 5 Because the officer suspected that
the letters . contained contraband instead of correspondence, he
would only be permitted to search until his suspicions were confirmed
or disproven." 6 Although the Ramsey officer was statutorily permitted
to search envelopes at the border, the U.S. Constitution does not
permit customs officers to exceed their authority or contravene the
purpose of the Fourth Amendment."' Thus, in confirming the offi-
cer's actions, the Court implicitly held that confuting the scope of an
envelope search to the officer's reasonable suspicion was constitu-
tional." 8 Because a statute cannot lower protections established by the
Constitution, the Court's affirmation of this law and procedure im-
plicitly upholds the officers' right to search mail, with reasonable sus-
picion, but only as necessary to confirm or dispel the suspicions. 19
held that a search may be no more intrusive than necessary to investigate adequately the
official's suspicions. Price, 472 F.2d at 574-75. Thus, a border search official may not con-
duct a strip search when a simple pat down would suffice in revealing drugs or smuggled
goods. Id. But see Palmer, 575 F.2d at 723-24 (noting that when a search "creates new
grounds" for further suspicion, the searching officials may continue with the search).
m Sce Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 624.
112 Id. at 624-25.
113 Id. at 614.
114 Id. at 624.
118 Sec id.
118 Sec Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 615-16.
117 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV; Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 615-16.
118 See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 624.
its Sec id. at 615-16,624.
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Importantly, in both Ramsey and Montoya de Hernandez, two cases
where the Court balanced the government's interest against the intru-
sion- upon the individual's privacy, the searching officers had a high
level of reasonable suspicion prior to the search."° The Montoya de
Hernandez Court held that the scope of the passenger's search, which
included lengthy wait, x-ray, and body cavity search, was reasonable, in
part because the extent of the search was directly related to the offi-
cers' suspicion."' Implicitly, the Court balanced the intrusion upon
the individual's privacy against the officers' suspicion and determined
that the search's scope was appropriate.' 22
Justice Brennan, dissenting in Montoya de Hernandez, argued that at
some point, routine searches cross the line to become severe intrusions,
at which time more stringent Fourth Amendment safeguards should be
required.'" Few U.S. Supreme Court cases, however, have defined spe-
cific factors that characterize a nonroutine search. 12" In 2004, in United
States v. Flores-Montano, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, identi-
fied some factors that supported the finding of a routine search.' 25 Per-
haps the inverse of these factors might contribute to a finding that a
search was nonroutine. 126 The Flares -Montano Court held that the disas-
sembly and reassembly of an automobile's gasoline tank was routine, in
part because the search was quick and did not burden the individual.' 27
Justice Rehnquist reasoned implicitly that because the gasoline tank
search was not a physical invasion on the person's hotly, did not expose
the individual to any harm or bodily contact, and did not cause perma-
nent physical damage, the search was not intrusive."8 Moreover, justice
Rehnquist implied that the duration of the search could be a factor,
and situations where the search takes too long might be deemed non-
routine.' 29 Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist's opinion left open the pos-
sibility that nonphysical searches . could also be intrusive; therefore, a
nonbodily search could be considered nonroutine.'"
120 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 533, 539-40; Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 614.
121
 473 U.S. at 542.
122 See id. at 539-40.
123 Id. at 551(Brennan. J., dissenting).
124 See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154-55 n.2; Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541.
123 541 U.S. at 155.
126 See id.
127 Id.
128 See id. at 154-55.
129 See id.; see also Adams, supra note 56 at 357 (suggesting that duration is a central fac-
tor in distinguishing between routine and nonroutine searches).
130 Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155; see Email from Orin Kerr, Associate Professor of
Law, The George Washington University Law School ( Jan. 4, 2007) (on file with author).
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In contrast, some lower federal courts have defined narrowly the
appropriate scope of nonroutine searches."' Lower courts have held
that customs officials should limit their searches to a scope that is no
more intrusive than necessary to gather information to fulfill CBP
duties."2 In this way, the lower courts have characterized reasonable
scope by linking the suspicion necessary for a nonroutine search to
the level of intrusiveness caused by the inspection." 3
IL THE LOWER COURTS' EXAMINATION OF BORDER LAPTOP SEARCHES
Border searches of laptop computers have not yet been addressed
by the U.S. Supreme Court.'" Only three federal courts have consid-
ered whether a computer search, including a search through the cache
of deleted items stored in a traveler's computer, is constitutional.'" Just
one of these cases, the 2006 decision by the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California in United States v. Arnold, has addressed the
question of whether a customs official may conduct a random laptop
search."6 Because a laptop or other digital media storage device is dif-
ferent—in that it is capable of storing vast amounts of personal, pro-
prietary, and confidential information—from a wallet or handbag,
courts may be hesitant to place computers in the group of items that
13 ► See Price, 472 F.2d at 574-75 (holding that after strip search dispelled officers' initial
suspicion, they were not justified in continuing with the search).
132 Arnold, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 1003. Courts in the Ninth Circuit have reasoned that a
nonroutine search must be limited in scope and that this scope must be within the
boundaries of the Fourth Amendment's requirements. Price, 472 F.2d at 575 (finding that a
customs search for contraband should have been limited in scope and that once it became
apparent that a bulge around the suspect's waist was not contraband, the customs officials
were "not entitled, based on appellant's nervousness alone, to keep looking until they
found something").
133 See Price, 472 F.2d at 575.
134 See United States v, Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1000 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
133 See United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990. 1006 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 505 (4th Cir. 2005); Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1007. On November 15,
2006, CBP officials conducted a search of a Dallas man's laptop computer after they dis-
covered he had been smuggling $60,000 into the United States. Jason Trahan, Dallas Man
Held on Airport Smuggling Charge, DAt.i.As MORNING News, Nov. 17, 2006, at 2A_ The search
revealed that the laptop contained information about nuclear materials and cyanide,.
which the traveler claimed was for his personal interest. Id. Although a court has not yet
considered whether the evidence gathered during this laptop search would be admissible,
this search was presumably constitutional because it was prefaced by reasonable suspicion.
Id.
In See Rouyn, 455 F.3d at 1006; Ickes, 393 F.3d at 505; Arnold, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 1007.
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may be routinely searched at a border." 7 Nevertheless, as demonstrated
above, the Supreme Court has examined a range of border searches
and determined most of them to be either routine and outside the
Fourth Amendment's requirements or nonroutine and reasonable." 8
This Part examines recent developments in the lower courts, in light of
the Supreme Court's border search jurisprudence, that suggest that a
laptop search may be less routine than a wallet or automobile search." 9
A. The Fourth Circuit Examines a Border Laptop Search Preceded by
Reasonable Suspicion: United States v. Ickes
In 2005, in United States v. Ickes, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit upheld a search of John Woodward Ickes, Jr., who had
his laptop computer with him in his van as he drove across the Cana-
dian and American border.") Ickes told U.S. customs agents that he
was returning from a vacation, which seemed unlikely to . the agents,
considering that the van appeared to contain "almost everything
[Ickes] owned:14i The agents commenced an inspection of Ickes's van,
and their suspicions were further raised when the cursory inspection
revealed a video camera "containing a tape of a tennis match which
focused excessively on a young ball boy." 142
 The agents proceeded to
conduct a more thorough search, which uncovered marijuana seeds,
marijuana pipes, a copy of a Virginia warrant for Ickes's arrest,
and child pornography in a photograph album." 3 When the agents
learned that Ickes was subject to two outstanding warrants, they placed
Ickes under arrest, continued to search the van, and examined the con-
tents of Ickes's computer and seventy-five diskettes, which contained
child pornography. 144
 Ickes filed a motion to suppress the contents dis-
covered from the computer and disk searches. 145 He claimed that this
137 See Arnold 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1007 (holding that a warrantless search of a laptop
computer at the border is unconstitutional). But see Ickes, 393 F.3d at 505 (holding that
such a search is constitutional).
138 See generally United States v. Flores-Montano. 541 U.S. 149 (2004) (finding a gaso-
line tank inspection to be routine); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531
(1985) (finding a strip search and body cavity search to be nonroutine yet reasonable);
United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977) (finding an inspection of incoming interna-
tional mail to be nonroutine and reasonable).
139 See infra notes 140-194 and accompanying text.
140 393 F.3d at 502.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 502-03.
144 Id.
14 ' Ickes, 393 F.3d at 503.
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evidence was the result of a warrantless and unconstitutional search
that violated his Fourth Amendment rights. 146 The district court denied
this motion. Ickes was convicted of transporting child pornography,
and he appealed his conviction. 147
The Fourth Circuit held that the evidence obtained by the search
was properly presented at Ickes's trial." 8 The court first affirmed the
customs agents' statutory authority to search Ickes's van and corn-
puter."9 Reasoning that the "plain language" of the statute was meant
to be read expansively, the court determined that a laptop fits into the
list of items a customs official may properly search. 15°
Next, the court considered whether, notwithstanding the statutory
authority, a border search of a laptop computer is constitutional."' Al-
though the court did not describe it as such, they employed a two-step
analysis to determine whether the customs agent had the requisite level
of suspicion and whether the search itself was reasonable. 15" First, the
court affirmed that probable cause was not necessary for the customs
agent to proceed, but although declining to indicate what level of suspi-
cion the agent must have to search Ickes's computer, the court implied
that the officers had reasonable suspicion to validate the search. 153 Next,
the court weighed the interests of the government against the individ-
ual's privacy interests, and found, as in the Supreme Court cases United
States v. Montoya de Hernandez and United States v. Ramsey, that at the bor-
ders, the balance favors the government's interests.154
B. The Ninth Circuit Examines a Border Laptop Search with Reasonable
Suspicion but Does Not Evaluate the Search's Intrusiveness:
United States v. Romm
In July 2006, in United States a Romm, the U.S. Court of Appeals




148 Id. at 504; sec 19 U.S.C. § 1581 (2000).
150 Ickes, 393 F.3d at 504; see 19 U.S.C. § 1581.
151 Ickes, 393 F.3d at 505.
152 Id. at 507; sec New Jersey v T.1.0., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (suggesting a two-step
analysis for the reasonableness of warrantless searches).
15' Ickes, 393 F.3d at 507. As proof that border officials must have some suspicion, the
court pointed to the ninny factors that led the officials to search Ickes's van, such as mari-
juana paraphernalia, printed child pornography, and an outstanding warrant for his ar-
rest. Id.
154 Id. at 506; see Montoya de _Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540; Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619.
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reasonable suspicion to search a laptop computer. 155
 In Romm, a pas-
senger was denied entry to Canada because, after he informed them
that he had a criminal record, a search by the Canadian Border Ser-
vices Agency uncovered illegal child pornography on his laptop coni
puter.' 56
 Mr. Romm was placed on a return flight to the United States,
and Canadian officials informed ICE officers of the reason for his re-
jection. 157
 Romm denied having any illegal pictures on his computer,
but a subsequent ICE search revealed that the computer contained
ten images of child pornography, all of which Romm had previously
deleted from his hard drive. 158
 Romm later appealed his conviction,
claiming in part that because the American officer did not have rea-
sonable suspicion, the search was unconstitutional:159
The Ninth Circuit echoed the Supreme Court's Montoya de Her-
nandez reasoning that routine searches at the border do not require
reasonable suspicion.'w But the court stopped short of distinguishing
the laptop search as routine or nonroutine, because Romm had not
included this claim in his opening brief. 161
 The court declined to con-
sider this factor, holding that issues that are not raised in opening briefs
are waived. 162
 Nevertheless, had the court decided that this search was a
nonroutine search, it likely would have been constitutional, because
ICE officers, informed by Canadian officials that Mr. Romm was trans-
porting child pornography on his computer, had reasonable suspicion
that a computer search would reveal illegal images. 163
155
 455 F.3d at 997.
156 Id. at 994.
157 Id.
ma Id.
159 Id. at 996.
la' Compare Romm, 455 F.3d at 996 (finding that customs officials should be granted
broad discretion to conduct suspicionless searches), with Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at
538 (finding that some searches are so intrusive that they require prior suspicion).
151 Romm, 955 F.3d at 997.
162 Id.
165 See id. at 994. Of course, how the Canadian officials came to discover that Romm
was transporting child pornography is less clear. See id. Canadian officials knew that Romm
was under probation in the state of Florida, where he pleaded "nolo contendere to two
counts of promoting sexual performance by a child and one count of child exploitation by
means of a computer." Id. at n.4. The Canadian customs official asked for and was granted
Romm's permission to turn on the computer and look on the computer's browsing his-
tory. Id. at 994. The history revealed that Romm had visited several Internet sites that con-
tained child pornography, and when the officer asked about these sites in relation to
Romm's probation, Romm responded, "That's it. My life's over." Id. Because Romm's Flor-
ida probation was presumably enough to give the customs officer reasonable suspicion, the
ensuing laptop search was likely permissible. Id. Similar to the United States, many coun-
tries have not yet codified their procedures regarding laptop searches at the borders, but
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C. The Central District of California Characterizes Border Laptop
Searches as Nonroutine: United States v. Arnold
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Return, in 2006, in Ar-
nold, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California held
that a similar border laptop search was an unconstitutional search and
seizure. 164 The court first found that the search of the defendant Ar-
nold's computer was nonroutine. 165 Although the court recognized the
longstanding history and importance of the border search exception, it
explained that this must take into account the intrusion upon the indi-
vidual's privacy) 66 The court compared a search of the information and
data stored on a passenger's computer to a strip search or body cavity
search, reasoning that the former can be as much, if not more, of an
intrusion into the dignity and privacy interests of a person as the lat-
ter. 167 The court reasoned that when a border search implicates the
dignity and privacy interests of the individual, the border search be-
comes intrusive and therefore nonroutine. 168
Because the court deemed the search of Arnold's computer to be
nonroutine, the opinion next turned to an analysis of the reasonable-
ness of the customs official's suspicion and search methods. 169 The
court first reasoned that a nonroutine search requires a heightened
level of suspicion, the existence of which was debatable in Mr. Arnold's
situation."° The court was not satisfied with the custom official's report,
which was supposed to detail specific suspicions or concerns she had
about the passenger prior to conducting a nonroutine search.'" Call-
ing the government's documentation a "broken chain," the court
noted that the only official memorandum of the official's suspicions
was completed a year after the arrest. 172 Based on inconsistencies and
shortcomings in the memorandum and the customs official's testi-
anecdotes from travelers reveal that this practice occurs in countries such as Canada and
England. Id.: see also Chris Nuttal, UK Customs Check for Laptop Porn, BBC NEWS ONLINE,
Aug. 13,1998, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/scietice/nature/150465.stm.
164 Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1007.
165 Id. at 1003.
166 Id. at 1002-03.
167
 Id. at 1000.
168 Id. at 1002 (quoting Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152).
169 Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1004.
170 Id. A customs official must have a heightened level of suspicion to conduct a non-
routine search of a passenger or his luggage. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541-42.
171 Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1004.
172 Id.
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mony,"3
 the court questioned the official's credibility." 4
 The court ac-
knowledged that Arnold may have exhibited behaviors such as moving
around in the customs line, eavesdropping on his fellow passengers'
conversations, and staring at his laptop while the official was searching
through his luggage. 175
 Nevertheless, the court found these actions to
be normal behavior for a passenger who has completed a twenty-hour
flight, and it held that the government did not have reasonable suspi-
cion to engage in a nonroutine search of Arnold's belongings."6
Next, the court turned to an analysis of whether the search itself
was reasonable in scope.'" The court determined that a search of Ar-
nold's computer was highly invasive. 178
 The opinion noted that corn-
.puters contain vast amounts of personal information, including diaries,
personal letters, medical information, photos and financial records." 9
Though the court acknowledged the government's "desire to prevent
the clear evil of smuggling through laptops and other storage devices
child pornography and other informational contraband," the court
stated that this was outweighed by an individual's liberty to travel with
vast amounts of private information. 189
 The court reasoned that such
an invasive search requires reasonable suspicion, and without it, the
search goes 'well beyond the goals of the customs statutes and the rea-
sonableness standard articulated in the Fourth Amendment." 191
 Find-
ing the search of Arnold's computer unconstitutional, the court sup-
pressed the results of the search during tria1. 182
175
 Id. at 1005. For example, the memorandum described Arnold as 'disheveled." Id.
During cross-examination, when the customs official was asked what "disheveled" meant,
she answered that "disheveled' means 'out of it." Id. Liter, the official stated that dishev-
eled was actually the term provided by the government's counsel, and not her own. Id.
Furthermore, the official described Arnold's answers as "vague and elusive," but later ad-
mitted that she had not asked questions that required specific answers. Id.
171 Id. at 1004. The customs official did not prepare her own report, and when she did
provide details about the circumstances surrounding the incident, she was "imprecise and
internally inconsistent." Id.
176 Id. at 1006.
178
 Arnold, 454 F. Stipp. 2d at 1006. The court noted, "Nervousness alone does not war-
rant an inference of reasonable suspicion." Id.
177 Id. at 1003.
17a Id.
179 Id. at 1003-04. The court also noted that computers contain confidential informa-
tion, such as attorney or doctor's Ides about their clients or patients. Id.
'a° Id. at 1007.
isiA rtwid,
 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1007.
187 Id.
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D. Disagreement Among the Federal Courts
The Central District of California's ruling in Arnold suggests that
there is some disagreement among the courts as to whether a laptop
search is routine or nonroutine, and whether such a search is appro-
priate in scope. 183
Despite the Ninth Circuit's finding that the laptop search in
Romm was constitutional, the Central District of California's Arnold
ruling is not inconsistent with the current Ninth Circuit position.'Bt
The Ninth Circuit in Romm refused to consider whether a search of a
laptop computer was nonroutine, because the appellant had not
raised this issue in his initial claim.H35 Because appellant waived his
claim that the laptop search was intrusive, the court presumed that
the search was routine. 186 Adhering to the Supreme Court's Montoya
de Hernandez ruling, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that a routine search
is permissible without probable cause or a warrant under the border
search exception. 187 Thus, because the court held that Mr. Romm's
laptop search was routine, reasonable suspicion was not necessary. 188
As in Romm, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ickes refused
to suppress evidence uncovered during a search of the passenger's
van upon reentry into the United States from Canada. 189 Here, too,
the court did not draw a distinction between a routine and a non-
routine search, implicitly because the search was prefaced by reason-
able suspicion.'" Therefore, the Roam search presumably would have
been permissible under either characterization . 191
183 See id. (finding a random laptop search to be nonroutine and thus unconstitu-
tional). But see Ickes, 393 F.3d at 507-08 (upholding a border search of an individual's lap-
top as constitutional); Mark Agee, Mixed Rulings Sow Confusion, FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, Nov. 21, 2006, at C3; Editorial, Looking into Laptops, L.A. Toms, Nov. 11, 2006,
at 20.
LB' See Romm, 455 F.3d at 1006; Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1007.
186 455 F.3d at 997.
188 Id.
187 Id. at 1006.
184 Id.
'89 Romm, 455 F.3d at 1006; Ickes, 393 F.3d at 507-08.
19° Sec Ickes, 393 F.3d at 504.
191 See id. Nevertheless, the Ickes court did limit its holding to the facts in that case. Id.
For example, the court described the defendant's claim that, should the court find for the
government, "any person carrying a laptop computer ... on an international flight would
be subject to a search of the files on the computer hard drive" as "far-fetched.' Id. at 506-
07. The court pointed out that in this circumstance, U.S. customs officials had reasonable
suspicion to believe that Mr. Ickes was carrying contraband into the country. Id. Although,
lest this holding be interpreted as upholding laptop searches only when predicated by
reasonable suspicion, the court noted that to state the probability that reasonable suspi-
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The Central District of California's decision in Arnold, however,
specifically examined whether such a search is routine. 192 Holding
that highly intrusive searches are not reasonable merely because they
take place at the border, the court drew a line between routine and
lionroutine searches.'" The court reasoned that a laptop search is
nonroutine, in part because this type of search implicates personal
privacy and dignity.'"
HI. CHALLENGING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LAPTOP SEARCHES
AT THE U.S. BORDERS
The Rehnquist Court leaves a legacy of complex border search
exception cases that carve out the rights and expectations of those
individuals crossing the U.S. borders. 195 Although the U.S. Supreme
Court has not specifically decided whether suspicionless border lap-
top searches are permissible, Justice Rehnquist's border search opin-
ions provide clues about those factors that would likely determine the
constitutionality of this type of search. 196 In 1977 in United States v.
Ramsey and again in 1985 in United States v. Montoya de Hemandezjus-
tice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, affirmed the constitutionality of
suspicionless, warrantless searches at the border, so long as those
searches were routine. 197 Similarly, in 2006, in United States v. Flores
Montano, Justice Rehnquist upheld the government's authority to con-
duct suspicionless inspections of automobiles that include disassembly
and reassembly of a vehicle's fuel tank, in part because this type of
search is noninvasive. 198 Acknowledging the need for CEP to control
the entry of persons and effects into the country, the Court has long
recognized the broad plenary powers of U.S. customs officials at the
border. 199
Despite the Court's strong support for CBP's authority, implicit in
its border search jurisprudence is an indication that some searches go
cions will give rise to more intrusive searches is a far cry from enthroning this notion as a
matter of constitutional law' Id. at 507.
192 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1003.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 1004.
to See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 153 (2004); United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606,
619 (1977).
198 See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154-55; Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 544.
197
 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541; Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616.
1913 541 U.S. at 155.
199 Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616.
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too farm When a nonroutine search is not preceded by the appropri-
ate level of suspicion, for example, or when the scope of any search is
unreasonable, courts should strike down those inspections as uncoil-
stitutional. 201 In those instances when the customs official has no rea-
sonable suspicion—such as when a traveler is selected at random for a
search—a laptop search is constitutional only if that search is rou-
tine.202
This Part argues that a suspicionless border laptop search is im-
permissible, because it exceeds the judicially-defined boundaries of a
constitutional border search. 203 This Part refutes the approach that
because it is nonphysical, a laptop search must therefore be routine,
and argues instead that a laptop search is nonroutine because it im-
plicates dignity and privacy interests. 204 Because of this, a random lap-
top search is so intrusive that it contravenes an individual's Fourth
Amendment rights at the borders." 5
A. Characterizing Computer Searches as Routine or Nonroutine
The 2006 decision in United Slates v. Arnold and the 2005 decision
in United States v. Ickes demonstrate that the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit could disagree about the circumstances under which a
200 See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540; see also Comment, Intrusive Border Searches:
Is Judicial Control Desirable?, 115 U. PA. L. 276, 287 (1966) ("Clearly, it is one thing to
stop a traveler to ask him his place and date of birth; this is hardly a nuisance. But it be-
comes a more serious and degrading business, increasingly an inconvenience and an af-
front to the dignity of the traveler, as the search progresses from his luggage to the con-
tents of his pockets, his clothing, his naked body, his rectum and his stomach.").
2°1 See United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 2006); see also
Comment, At the Border of Reasonableness: Searches by Custom Officials, 53 CORNELL L. REV.
871, 884 (1968) ("A line must be drawn between acceptable and unacceptable searches at
the border.").
"3 See Flores-Montano,.541 U.S. at 155; Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538. In fact,
despite the small amount of suspicion that preceded the Arnold search, the U.S. govern-
ment might agree with this argument. Editorial, supra note 183. A Los Angeles Times edito-
rial reported that the government claimed that customs officials will not conduct a laptop
search until a routine check of the traveler's background or travel plans reveals some sus-
picion. Id. If this protocol is followed throughout the agency, then the government has
implicitly agreed that some reasonable suspicion must be necessary to search one's laptop.
See id. However, until this protocol is codified legislatively, any passenger's laptop may be
searched on the basis of very little or no reasonable suspicion. See Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d
at 1004.
"3 See infra notes 206-253 and accompanying text.
204 Sec infra notes 206-253 and accompanying text.
205 See infra notes 206-253 and accompanying text.
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laptop search might be considered constitutional. 206
 One approach to
resolve this tension is to examine those factors that the courts have
employed to characterize a border search as notiroutine. 207
 The U.S.
Supreme Court has not drawn an explicit line between routine and
nonroutine searches.208
 Both the Supreme Court and lower courts'
border search cases provide guidance as to specific factors that might
contribute to a finding that a computer search is intrusive. 249
 Courts
have recognized a -range of elements that contribute to a search's in-
trusiveness. 21 ° This section evaluates the possible intrusion to both to
one's body and one's dignity, and concludes that either type of intru-
sion might contribute to a nonroutine search. 2 "
B. Physical Intrusiveness Should Not Be the Only Element
of a Nonroutine Search
The courts have not yet come to agreement about how to charac-
terize the routiness of a laptop search because Ickes examined a situa-
tion where there was prior reasonable suspicion and Arnold examined
a situation where there was no reasonable suspicion. 212
 One approach
to resolve this uncertainty is to examine those factors that the courts
have employed to characterize a border search as nonroutine. 213 In
general, the more physical a search is, the more likely it is to be con-
sidered nonroutine. 214
Some courts have held that a nonroutine search likely involves an
element of physical intrusion on the suspect's body or clothing; actual
physical contact is required. 215
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
206 See United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 506 (4th Cir. 2005); Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d
at 1003.
20 See United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 511-12 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v.
Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 838 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. McMurray, 747 F.2d 1417, 1420
(11th Cir. 1984).
"8
 See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152. In holding that a search of an automobile gaso-
line tank is routine, the Court implicitly distinguished the two types of searches but did not
indicate at what point a search becomes nonrou tine. See id.
2o5 See id. at 154-55; Braks, 842 F.2d at 511-12; Oyekan, 786 F.2d at 838; McMurray, 747
F.2d at 1420.
20 See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154-55; Braks, 842 F.2d at 511-12; Oyekan, 786 F.2d at
838; McMurray, 747 F.2d at 1420.
211 See infra notes 212-253 and accompanying text.
515
 See Ickes, 393 F.3d at 504; Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1003.
513 See Braks, 842 F.2d at 511-12; Oyekan, 786 F.2d at 838; McMurray, 747 F.2d at 1420.
514 See United States v. Charleus, 871 F.2d 265, 268 (2d Cir. 1989); Braks, 842 F.2d at
511-12.
215
 See Charleus, 871 F.2d at 268; Bruits, 842 F.2d at 511-12.
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Circuit uses a six-part analysis that asks questions about the physicality
of the search, for example, whether the suspect was required to dis-
robe or encountered pain or danger during the search. 216 Certainly,
on this end of the spectrum, a computer search would likely be con-
sidered routine, because a laptop search is not physical; the suspect
encounters no pain during the search, and he is not required to ex-
pose any part of his body for a tactile or visual search. 217 A traveler
whose laptop is randomly searched would not likely succeed in dem-
onstrating that this search is intrusive in the same way that a strip
search is physically intrusive. 218
Nevertheless, physicality is not the only element that courts might
use to distinguish a search as intrusive. 219 Rather, the totality of the
invasiveness should determine whether a search is intrusive and thus,
nouroutine. 220 In fact, the Supreme Court in Flores-Montano cautioned
against using a multipart balancing test to decide the routineness of
an automobile search. 2" Nevertheless, the Court implied that a non-
routine search is intrusive. 222 The Court has explicitly recognized that
a search is intrusive when it implicates dignity and privacy in terests. 223
In fact, even the more stringent First Circuit six-part analysis,
which focuses on the physical aspects of a nonroutine search, considers
whether the search violated the suspect's reasonable expectations of
privacy. 224 The Supreme Court has stated unequivocally that a traveler's
expectation of privacy at the border is quite low. 226 Nevertheless, a judi-
cial invocation of a traveler's privacy indicates that one does have a
right to expect that some items will be kept private from random or
216 Braks, 842 F.2d at 511-12.
217 Id. at 512. The court noted that the only types of border search of an individual's
person that have been consistently held to be non-routine are strip-searches and body-
cavity searches," but noted that these are fact specific situations that require a balancing of
the factors. Id. at 512-13. Another court drew the distinction between an x-ray of a per-
son's body and his luggage, holding that the latter would only be nonroutine if it caused
physical damage to the property. United States v. Okafor, 285 F.3d 842,846 (9th Ci•. 2002).
The court noted that an incision made in the bag's interior lining, on the other hand,
could be considered nonroutine. Id,
218 See Braks, 842 F.2d at 511-12.
219 See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155 11.2.
See Charleus, 871 F.2d at 268.
ni 541 U.S. at 152.
222 See id.
223 Id.
224 Braks, 842 F.2d at 512.
225 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 539-40.
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unwarranted inspection. 226
 Although a traveler's expectation of privacy
is lower at the border, he does not abrogate all constitutional protec-
tions simply by entering or exiting the counlry. 227
 A person should have
an expectation that the information on his computer, which might con-
tain numerous personal, proprietary, and professional files, would be
kept more private than a wallet or handbag, which also contain private
items but have the capability and likelihood of storing much less. 228 A
search of a passenger's computer or digital media storage' device is
uniquely different from an accordion file or hard copy of docu-
ments.229
 Just as the Supreme Court has modified its Fourth Amend-
ment warrantless search jurisprudence for situations involving automo-
biles230
 or school lockers,23 ' rapidly expanding digital storage
technology requires an adapted jurisprudence to respond to constitu-
tional challenges posed by ever-expanding technological searches at the
country's borders. 232
. C. A Laptop Search Is an Intrusion Upon. One's Dignity and Privacy
Even though a laptop search might not match the physical intru-
siveness of a body cavity search, it is a deeply personal intrusion.233
There are intrusive, nonphysical elements of a laptop search that
might characterize it as nonroutine. 234
 Individuals use computers to
226
 See Braks, 842 F.2d at 512; see also David Allen Jordan, Decrypting the Fourth Amend-
ment: Warrantless NSA Surveillance and the Enhanced Expectation of Privacy Provided by Encrypted
Voice Over Internet Protocol, 47 B.C. L. REV. 505, 539 (2006) ("The issue of whether an item is
constitutionally protected is determined based solely on whether the person claiming pro-
tection had manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in that item, and whether that
expectation is one which society is willing to recognize as reasonable.").
227 See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 599 n.6 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("[ -F] he border-search rule does not represent any exception to our uniform
insistence under the Fourth Amendment that the police may not be loosed upon the
populace with no limits • .").
228
 See Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1004. Additionally, a search of one's laptop might be
very embarrassing or reveal private details, and is thus intrusive. United States v. Mejia, 720
F.2d 1378, 1382 (5th Cir. 1983) (rejecting the requirement of a physical element for a
nonroutine search, instead holding that "intrusion is keyed to embarrassment, indignity,
and invasion of privacy").
229 See Arnold, 454 F. Supp, 2d at 1004.
2" See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925)
ssi See New jersey v. T.L.O.. 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985).
232 See Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1004.
233
 Sec Mcjia, 720 F.2clat 1382; see also United States v. Palmer, 575 F.2d 721, 723 (9th
Cir. 1978) (" [B]etween a search of pockets and a strip search there can be a variety of types
of intrusion, with varying degrees of intrusiveness .... It is hardly feasible to enunciate a
clear and simple standard for each.").
234 See Mcjia, 720 F.2d at 1382.
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store massive amounts of data; files; passwords; and financial, per-
sonal, and professional information.253 Some courts have left open the
possibility that a border search could be considered nonroutine if it is
invasive, intrusive, or embarrassing. 236 This rubric recognizes that dif-
ferent types of searches include varying levels of intrusion that may
trigger greater Fourth Amendment protections. 237 A passenger sub-
jected to a random, suspicionless laptop search might feel great em-
barrassment and an invasion of her privacy by a customs official
searching through her hard drive and cached and deleted files. 238
If a laptop search falls somewhere between a routine wallet search
and a nonroutine x-ray or body cavity search, then courts should first
recognize that a laptop is substantively different from a wallet. 239 The
difference is in the reading or collection of information; in a wallet
search, a customs officer might examine identification cards, licenses,
money, or credit cards, all of which are admittedly personal. 24° But a
laptop search, especially one in which the customs officer opens files,
searches through a user's Internet browsing history, and examines his
cached or deleted files, is more akin to reading a passenger's diary,
reading the contents of international mail, examining legal documents
that he takes aboard an airplane, or even subjecting him to a lie-
detector test."'
In light of this, a laptop search should be characterized as deeply
intrusive.242 When CBP or ICE officials open a person's laptop and
examine its contents—including, in many cases, a full search of the
239 Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1003-04. Listing the many types of private information
stored on a laptop, Judge Pregerson stated:
A laptop and its storage devices have the potential to contain vast amounts of
information. People keep all types of personal information on computers, in-
cluding diaries, personal letters, medical information, photos and financial
records. Attorneys' computers may contain confidential client information.
Reporters' computers may contain information about confidential sources or
story leads. Inventors and corporate executives' computers may contain trade
secrets.
Id.
236 ScrUn ited States v. Dorsey, 641 F.2d 1213,1218 (7th Cir. 1981).
237 See id. at 1216.
298 See Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1003-04.
229 See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155; Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1003-04.
219 See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155; Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1003-04.
241 see Rams -ty 431 U.S. at 615; Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1007.
212 See Braks, 842 F.2d at 511-12; see also Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1000 ("Electronic
storage devices function as an extension of our own memory. They are capable of storing
our thoughts, ranging from the most whimsical to the most profound.").
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cache of deleted items—this search could reveal much more personal
information than what is•found when customs officials pat down a pas-
senger, read a hard copy of her documents, ask her to empty her
pockets, or rifle through her luggage. 243
 If the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit does review Arnold, the court would examine
the intrusion upon Mr. Arnold's privacy caused by the CBP laptop
search against the level of suspicion on the part of the inspecting offi-
cer. 244
 In Mr. Arnold's case, the level of intrusion was high and the
level of suspicion was very low. 245
 When the customs official selected
him at random, the official was unaware that the laptop search might
contain child pornography. 246
 The result of the ensuing search should
not force him to abrogate his Fourth Amendment right against un-
constitutional searches. 247
Although a court might be unsympathetic toward the privacy in-
terests of someone who collects child pornography, the issue should be
considered in light of its impact on the general public. 248 Any passenger
traveling with a computer 'might store personal information or private
documents on the hard drive. 249 A random laptop search would impli-
cate dignity and privacy interests of the individual, thus causing the
search to be intrusive. 250 A laptop might contain private photographs,
passwords, financial records, legal pornography, personal email corre-
spondence, confidential business records, home movies, medical in-
formation, or music files that a person considers very private. 251 Be-
cause a computer can contain vast amounts of data that a passenger is
unlikely to pack for a vacation or trip, a search through its hard drive is
not analogous to looking through a person's luggage, wallet, or auto-
mobile.252 It is much more personal, and implicates dignity and privacy
interests that should contribute to a finding that a laptop search is in-
tr usive. 253
245 See Braks, 842 . F.2d at 511-12; Dorsey, 641 F.2d at 1218; Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at
1000.
444
	 Braks, 842 F.2d at 511-12; Dorsey, 641 F.2d at 1218; Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at
1000.
445 Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1000.
246 Id. at 1006.
247 See id. at 1007.
2413 See id. at 1000-01.
2" See id. at 1000.
236 See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152.
251 See Arnold, 454 F. Su pp. 2d at 1003-04.
222
 See id. at 1000.
453 See id. at 1003.
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IV. THE SCOPE OF A LAPTOP SEARCH CONTRIBUTES TO ITS
CONSTITUTIONALITY
In the event that a laptop search is permissible—either because
the search is routine, thus making reasonable suspicion unnecessary,
or because the laptop search is nonroutine and preceded by the req-
uisite level of suspicion—there is still another requirement for the
search to be constitutional. 254 A border search must be conducted in a
reasonable manner. 255 Courts have interpreted this to mean that a
border search may be no more intrusive than necessary to confirm or
dispel the searching official's reasonable suspicions. 256 A laptop search
that is broader in scope than necessary to confirm or dispel the
searching agent's suspicions would likely be too invasive, and thus un-
constitutional. 257
A. Even if Permissible, Border Laptop Searches Must Be Limited in. Scope
In 2004, in United States v. Flores-Montano, the U.S. Supreme Court
listed several factors that contributed to a finding that a gasoline tank
search was routine. 258 For example, the Court noted that the disassem-
bly and reassembly were relatively quick and the search would not pre-
vent an innocent individual from using his car shortly after the
search.259 The methods used by customs officials who search interna-
tional passengers' laptops, on the other hand, might range from simply
opening the computer to seizing the device and running advanced
searches on the hard drive's documents, deleted files, and Internet
cache.269 Officials might retain the equipment for weeks, thus prevent-
ing the individual from accessing his computer and separating him
from potentially important documents and files. 261 The amount of time
a laptop search takes, compared to a routine automobile or pat-down
search, could distinguish laptop searches as unreasonable in scope. 262
264 See New jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985).
265 See id.
256 See, e.g„ United States v. Price, 472 F.2d 573, 574-75 (9th Cir. 1973).
257 See United States v, Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 (2004).
256 Id.
259 Id. Note, though, that the Court also reasoned that the search was valid because
customs officials caused no permanent damage, which does not apply to laptop searches,
where the issues of permanent physical damage, usability, and the user's post-search safety
are not applicable. See id.
269 See, e.g., United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2006).
261 Id.; see also Gilden, supra note 2.
262 Sec Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155; United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999,
1001 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Email from Orin Kerr, supra note 130.
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The Court's evaluation of reasonable search methods balances
the need to protect the country's borders against unreasonable inva-
sions of privacy. 263
 This balance, admittedly favoring the government's
interests, limits the extent and manner in which an item may be
searched. 264 For example, in 1977, in United States v. Ramsey, the Court
found that a customs official was statutorily permitted to open an en-
velope to determine if the letter contained narcotics, but the official
would not have been permitted to read the letter. 265 Similarly, a bor-
der official could be allowed to open a computer or examine its exte-
rior to determine if the computer contained an explosive, but could
not read its contents. 266
 If the official's suspicion were related some-
how to the contents of the computer—as the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit determined in the 2005 case United States v.
Ickes—then here too customs officials should be restrained in the
scope of a laptop search. 267
 Their search should be limited to a scope
that either confirms or dispels their initial suspicion. 268
H. Policy Concerns That Support Limiting the Scope of a Search
Assuming arguendo that a laptop search is nonroutine, yet is pre-
ceded by the requisite level of reasonable suspicion, then the reason-
able suspicion requirement raises an important issue about the policy
behind the scope of a laptop search.269
 The scope of a nonroutine
search must be related to a specific suspicion. 2" For example, although
a body-cavity search might be intended to confirm or dispel an officer's
specific suspicions about a woman suspected of smuggling narcoties, 271
2.63
 United States. v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539 (1985). According to
some, the Montoya de Hernandez Court took a strict approach toward a passenger suspected
of smuggling drugs into the country, because "she had made her bed .... Nowhere did
the majority mention a human dignity concern arising from the sixteen hour delay pre-'
ceding the supervising officer seeking a magistrate's order for a search." Maxine D.
Goodman. Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740,
772 (2006). Nevertheless, the scope of Ms. Montoya de Hernandez's body cavity and x-ray
searches, intrusive as they may seem compared to a laptop search, was presumably related
in scope to the official's reasonable suspicion about the passenger. See Montoya de Hernan-
dez, 473 U.S. at 541.
264
 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540.
265
 931 U.S. 606, 624 (1977).
266 See id.
267 See 393 F.3d 501, 507-08 (4th Cir. 2005).
268 See id.
269 See Price, 472 F.2d at 575.
27° See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541.
271 See id.
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a laptop search would not be an appropriate search for a passenger
suspected of smuggling drugs. 272
 A laptop search of an individual's files
and data, assuming this search was preceded by reasonable suspicion,
would only be appropriate if customs officials suspect the individual of
bringing illegal data or files into or out of the country. 2"
hi providing policy reasons to justify the border search exception,
the Supreme Court has reasoned that the GBP must have the authority
to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the introduction of
contraband into this country. 274 Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist's opin-
ions provide additional justifications in each of the border search cases
that substantiate the need to search one's property without suspicion. 275
In 1985, in United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, Justice Rehnquist
pointed to a "veritable national crisis" created by international narcot-
ics smugglers. 276 Rehnquist's post-September 11th decision in Flores-
Montano emphasized the government's authority to search vehicles at
the border, reasoning that the government's duty to protect the United
States from illegal people and items is heightened at the country's bor-
ders. 277 This argument suggests that the subject matter of triggering
events is broad indeed. 278 But if the purpose of a search is to seek an-
swers to a particular suspicion unrelated to any national emergency,
then a laptop search could be considered unreasonable in scope. 279
Some might argue that a laptop could contain a bomb or other
explosive device, and that the customs officials have plenary powers to
272 See id.
273 Ste Arnold, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 1007. The type of search plays a critical role in charac-
terizing the scope as reasonable or not. See id. at 1001. For example, if every single file is
searched electronically by special software scanning the entire hard drive, its cache, and
Internet browsing history, the scope of that search is much more intrusive than one in
which a customs officer simply opens files that appear immediately suspicious on the com-
puter's desktop. See id, Both are intrusive, but the former, a more comprehensive scan, is
more like an x-ray or body-cavity search than a routine wallet search or opening of an en-
velope. See id.
274 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537 (citing Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616-617).
275 Id. at 538.
276 Id.
277 541 U.S. at 152.
2711 Id. Some have interpreted Rehnquist's decisions after September 11, 2001 as more
restrictive of Fourth Amendment rights,* suggesting that the Court's recognition of in-
creased governmental authority at the borders is a response to national security concerns.
See Madhavi M. McCall & Michael A. McCall, ChiefJustice William Rehnquist: His Lato ,and-
Order Legacy and Impact on Criminal Justice, 39 AKRox L. REV. 323, 348 (2006).
279 See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152. In a random laptop search, the customs official
presumably does not expect to find a specific type of contraband. See Arnold, 454 F.
Supp. 2d at 1007.
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seek out threats against the country. 28° Certainly, scanning a computer
in an x-ray machine for explosives would be a permissible customs
search, because it is routine. 28t A physical search of the device is nei-
ther intrusive nor unreasonable in scope, and would thus be constitu-
tional. 282
 A more difficult. question concerns appropriateness of
searching a laptop belonging to an individual suspected of smuggling
illegal data, files, or plans. 2" Customs officials in those circumstances
should be required to articulate particularized suspicion as it relates
to the desired digital search. 284
Justice Rehnquist's opinions upholding government searches at.
America's borders confirm the reasons behind the border search juris-
prudence, but they also relate to national concerns at issue at the time
they were authored. 286
 After Chief Justice Rehnquist passed away in
September 2005, John Roberts, Jr. was selected and confirmed to re-
place him as Chief Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court. 286 It is difficult
to predict how the Roberts Court might address the issue of suspi-
cionless border searches, including laptop searches. 287
 Nevertheless,
clues from Justice Roberts's tenure on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit indicate that he, too, would likely rule in
favor of the government.288 Although Roberts's judiCial philosophy has
286 See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538. In the situation where customs officials
found plans for explosives on the computer of an individual suspected of smuggling cash,
the justification for the search is more founded, although here too there was reasonable
suspicion precedent to the laptop search. See Trahan, supra note 135.
2a1 See Arnold, 454 F. Su pp. 2d at 1007.
232 See id.
283 See Trahan, supra note 135.
284 See Terry V, Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968).
285
 See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537 (citing Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616-617).
288
 Linda Greenhouse, A Ceremonial Start to the Session as the Supreme Court Welcomes a
New Chief N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2005, at A25; Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice Rehnquist
Dies at 80, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, at Al.
287 See Thomas K. Clancy, Hints of the Future?: John Roberts, Jr 's Fourth Amendment Cases as
an Appellate Judge, 35 U. BALT. L. REV. 185. 185-86 (2005). One scholar, "in the manner of
reading tea-leaves" examined Roberts's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for clues about
how he might address search and seizure cases that come before the Supreme Court. Id. at
186.
288 See id. As an appellate judge, Judge Roberts reviewed eight Fourth Amendment
cases, and in each one he upheld the government's right to search or seize the property in
question. See United States v. Jackson, 415 F.3d 88, 101 (D.C. Cir. 2005); United States v.
Lawson, 410 F.3d 735, 736 (D.C. Cir. 2005); United States v. Moore, 394 F.3d 925, 926
(D.C. Cir. 2005); Hedgepeth v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit, 386 F.3d 1148, 1149 (D.C. Cir.
2004); United States v. Holmes, 385 F.3d 786, 787 (D.C. Cir. 2004); United States v. Brown,
374 F.3d 1326, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 2004); United States v. Riley, 351 F.3d 1265, 1266 (D.C. Cir.
2003); Stewart v. Evans, 351 F.3d 1239, 1240-41 (D.C. Cir. 2003). In one now famous case,
then Judge Roberts upheld a government official's arrest of a twelve-year-old girl who ate a
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not yet been detailed by his written opinions, Roberts's jurisprudence is
closely aligned with that of his former mentor, William Relniquist. 289
With the addition of Justice Samuel Alito in 2006, who replaced Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court's holdings could shift even further to
the right.290 While a more conservative panel does increase the possibil-
ity that, in a border laptop case, the Court would side with the govern-
ment in the interest of national security and the government's plenary
powers, that result is not guaranteed.291 The Supreme Court has the
opportunity to recognize the unique challenges presented by new and
constantly evolving technology, and should respond in a way that limits
the government's authority to impede upon an individual's Fourth
Amendment rights at the country's borders. 292
CONCLUSION
At the borders, the government's interest in regulating individuals
and their possessions is strong. This has been acknowledged by both
the U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal courts. In response to the
government's interest, the courts have allowed CBP and ICE officials
broad plenary authority to conduct routine searches without suspicion
at the borders. But where a border search is not routine, because it is
invasive, intrusive, or implicates dignity and privacy concerns, the cus-
toms official must have some reasonable suspicion before selecting that
passenger and conducting the search. A laptop is categorically different
from a wallet or handbag, because it is a deeply personal device with a
seemingly unlimited capacity for private and potentially embarrassing
information. The standard of review for the intrusiveness of a search
should not be based on simply its physical effect, but also the impact on
the individual's dignity, which is implicated by a laptop search. Because
french fry on the Washington, D.C. subway. Hedgepeth, 386 F.3d at 1159. Roberts denied
that the arrest violated her Fourth Amendment rights, in part because the police officer
had probable cause to believe the child was violating the law. Id.
289 Charles Lane, Short Record as Judge Is Under a Microscope, WAsn. Pos•r, July 25, 2005,
at A01.
29° Michiko Kakutani, Court No Longer Divided: Conservatives in Triumph, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
23, 2007, at El; David D. Kirkpatrick, Alito Clears Final Hurdle for Confirmation to Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 31, 2006, at Al.
291 See Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2410 (2007). In a unanimous decision,
the Court decided that when an automobile is stopped by a police officer, every passenger
in the car has standing to challenge that stop under the Fourth Amendment. Id. The deci-
sion's recognition of an individual's Fourth Amendment rights suggests that the Court is
willing to expand its definition of those protected by the Fourth Amendment, even in light
of increased national security concerns. Sec id.
252 See supra notes 195-291 and accompanying text.
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of this, a laptop search is more akin to searching inside an individual's
diary or brain, and should thus be considered nonroutine. Laptop
searches should therefore be predicated by some reasonable suspicion
by the customs officer conducting the search.
In addition to the legal analysis described above, two additional
factors might substantially affect the future of border searches of lap-
top computers. First, considering that Justice Rehnquist was the au-
thor of some the Supreme Court's most significant border search
cases, the different composition of the Court since his passing might
change the direction of the jurisprudence this area. Second, the po-
litical and legal landscape has changed significantly since September
11, 2001. The Court's 2004 decision in United States v. Flares-Montano is
to date the only post-September 11th case that questions—and ulti-
mately affirms—the plenary powers of customs officials. In light of
the policy issues surrounding widening customs officials' powers, fu-
ture jurisprudence will likely take into account the myriad of technol-
ogy that travelers carry along on a trip and inform travelers what, if
an items will remain private as they traverse America's borders.
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